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A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem
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MARTIN BICHLER
We propose a truthful-in-expectation, (1 − 1/e)-approximation mechanism for a strategic variant of the
generalized assignment problem (GAP). In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins
without exceeding the capacity of any singular bin. In the strategic variant of the problem we study, values
for assigning items to bins are the private information of bidders and the mechanism should provide bidders
with incentives to truthfully report their values. The approximation ratio of the mechanism is a significant
improvement over the approximation ratio of the existing truthful mechanism for GAP.
The proposed mechanism comprises a novel convex optimization program as the allocation rule as well as
an appropriate payment rule. To implement the convex program in polynomial time, we propose a fractional
local search algorithm which approximates the optimal solution within an arbitrarily small error leading to
an approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism. The presented algorithm improves upon the existing
optimization algorithms for GAP in terms of simplicity and runtime while the approximation ratio closely
matches the best approximation ratio given for GAP when all inputs are publicly known.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We analyze the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in an environment where val-
uations are private information of distributed decision makers.1 In GAP, a set of m
items has to be assigned to a set of n bins. Each bin associates a different value and
weight to each item and has a limited capacity. An allocation may assign each bin a
subset of items not exceeding the capacity of the bin. For each of these subsets, the
valuation is additive in the values of items contained in the subset. The goal is to find
a feasible assignment of items to bins to maximize social welfare, the sum of generated
values by the assignment.
GAP has also been defined in the literature as a (closely related) minimization
problem. In the minimization GAP, the assignment of items to bins incurs costs; the
goal of this optimization problem is to find a feasible assignment of minimum total
cost. From an optimization point of view, these two variants of GAP are equivalent
[Martello and Toth 1992].
1A one-page abstract of this paper appeared in WINE 2014.
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GAP is a well-known problem in combinatorial optimization and operations re-
search. It can be considered as a generalization of the problem of finding a maximum
weight matching in a weighted bipartite graph, the assignment problem [Kuhn 1955;
Ferland 1998]. GAP has many real-world applications including applications in re-
source scheduling problems such as machine scheduling, classroom scheduling and
employee scheduling [Zimokha and Rubinstein 1988]. GAP is commonly applied in
transportation and routing [Ruland 1999; Fisher and Jaikumar 1981]. There is a long
list of reported applications of GAP in telecommunication, production planning and
facility location applications [Bressoud et al. 2003; Dobson and Nambimadom 2001;
Ross and Soland 1977; Klastorin 1979]. GAP can also be applied in supply chain and
logistics. Kalagnanam et al. [2001] discuss the computational complexity of clearing
markets in a double auction and formulates the problem with GAP. For a survey of
applications of GAP, we refer the reader to O¨ncan [2007].
In many situations, weights and capacities are intrinsic attributes of items and bins
and are therefore readily known and verifiable. For example, in process industries such
as paper and steel, standard geometries such as width, length and weight are used,
and buyers typically bid for rolls of paper or steel of a desired width [Kalagnanam et al.
2001].
By contrast, the associated value of a specific assignment has to be extracted through
communication with buyers. In service areas, for example, the cost of providing a ser-
vice to a certain group (weight) at an affordable cost (capacity) are known, although
the business value of a service is only known to the recipient of the service.
Examples like these motivate the study of a strategic variant of GAP where valua-
tions are assumed to be private information known only to the bidders while weights
and capacities are publicly known. There are two obstacles in finding a solution to this
strategic variant. First, GAP is a NP-hard problem. Hence, computing its optimal so-
cial welfare is intractable even if the valuations are known. Second, maximizing the
social welfare necessitates knowing valuations, but this is private information and can
be truthfully extracted solely by providing incentives using payment rules. Overcom-
ing both of these obstacles simultaneously is the subject of algorithmic mechanism
design [Nisan and Ronen 2001].
In this paper, we propose a solution by which the two obstacles, maximizing the
social welfare of GAP as well as extracting true valuations of bidders, are surmounted.
The solution provides bidders with incentives to report their valuations truthfully and
runs in polynomial time approximating the social welfare with a provable ratio of at
least 1− 1/e.
1.1. Challenges in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
In algorithmic mechanism design, a mechanism designer wishes to solve an opti-
mization problem, but the inputs to this problem are the private information of self-
interested players. The mechanism designer must thus design a mechanism that
solves the optimization problem while encouraging the bidders to truthfully reveal
their information. The game-theoretic concept of truthfulness guarantees that a bid-
der is better off truthfully interacting with the mechanism regardless of what the other
bidders do.
The well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) technique provides truthfulness as
well as social welfare maximization in every combinatorial auction. The VCG tech-
nique, however, is applicable only when the optimal social welfare can be computed
to optimality. Yet, in many cases, including our problem, optimizing social welfare is
computationally intractable which makes the VCG technique inapplicable. Usually,
when faced with computational intractability, computer scientists turn to approxima-
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tions or heuristics. The VCG technique, unfortunately, cannot be directly applied to
approximate solutions [Nisan and Ronen 2007]. In order to resolve the clash between
approximation and truthfulness, the maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR) alloca-
tion rules are introduced.
MIDR is the only known general approach for designing randomized truthful mech-
anisms. An MIDR algorithm fixes a set of distributions over feasible solutions (the
distributional range) independently of the valuations reported by the self-interested
players, and outputs a random sample from the distribution that maximizes expected
(reported) welfare [Dobzinski and Dughmi 2009]. The best option for a mechanism de-
signer is to devise a MIDR containing an approximation of the optimal social welfare
that (very closely) matches the best approximation guarantee known for the problem
for which the underlying data are publicly known. Finding this type of MIDR or de-
signing an approximation truthful mechanism is not always possible. Several authors
have shown that it is impossible to achieve the same approximation factor in truth-
ful mechanisms [Lavi et al. 2003; Papadimitriou et al. 2008; Dobzinski and Vondra´k
2013; Dughmi and Vondra´k 2015; Dobzinski and Vondra´k 2012].
Looking more closely at the approximation algorithms presented for GAP, we ob-
serve that no algorithm can serve as a MIDR allocation rule, although GAP with-
out incentives has been studied extensively in the literature. Chekuri and Khanna
[2005] explicitly state that the algorithm of Shmoys and Tardos [1993] can be adapted
to provide a 2-approximation. Later, Fleischer et al. [2006] improved the factor to
1 − 1/e. Using a reduction to submodular maximization subject to a matroid con-
straint, Calinescu et al. [2011] achieved a ratio of 1 − 1/e − o(1) without using the
ellipsoid method which was pivotal in the work done by Fleischer et al. [2006]. An al-
gorithm due to Feige and Vondrak [2006] yields an approximation factor of 1− 1/e+ ρ,
ρ ≈ 10−180 which is the best given approximation ratio for GAP. Chakrabarty and Goel
[2010] provide the best-known hardness result showing it is NP-hard to approximate
GAP to any factor better than 10/11.
According to our observations, all foregoing approximation algorithms comprise two
algorithms: a relaxation algorithm and a rounding algorithm. In order to devise truth-
ful mechanisms, Dughmi et al. [2011a] propose an approach which optimizes directly
on the outcome of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the outcome of the re-
laxation algorithm. Since the rounding procedure is embedded into the objective func-
tion, this approach is not always computationally tractable. Assuming the optimization
problem can be solved efficiently and the rounding scheme is independent of bidders’
valuations, this approach always leads to a MIDR algorithm and is referred to as con-
vex rounding.
Lavi and Swamy [2011] propose a framework for deriving MIDR mechanisms from
linear programming relaxations. They solve the relaxed problem in the first step and
then use a special rounding method (convex decomposition) to obtain a randomized in-
tegral allocation. Although Lavi and Swamy also use the common composition of relax-
ation and rounding algorithms, their special rounding procedure produces an expected
allocation which is always identical to the scaled down input of the rounding algorithm,
component-wise. Of interest, the rounding procedure used by Lavi and Swamy, guar-
antees truthfulness-in-expectation. Designing truthful mechanisms using the frame-
work of Lavi and Swamy for a given problem is straightforward, however, this type of
mechanisms is slow in practice and requires many black-box invocations of an existing
approximation algorithm for the problem. Very recently, Azar et al. [2015] present a
truthful-in-expectation 1/2-approximation algorithm for GAP with private values us-
ing the framework proposed by Lavi and Swamy and a new rounding technique.
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1.2. Results and Techniques
It is possible to use the framework developed by Lavi and Swamy [2011] to design a
truthful-in-expectation 1/2-approximation mechanism for GAP; in order to guarantee
an improved approximation ratio as well as a higher performance, we follow the con-
vex rounding technique. The main challenge in using convex rounding is to design an
appropriate rounding scheme which induces a convex optimization problem. Moreover,
the rounding scheme should return a feasible solution containing a good approxima-
tion of the fractional value.
We design a rounding algorithm with the desired properties for GAP. Using the
rounding algorithm to obtain a MIDR, we directly optimize over the outcome of the
rounding procedure rather than over the outcome of the relaxation algorithm. Us-
ing this technique, we formulate GAP as a convex optimization problem where the
objective function equals the expected value of a rounding procedure. In contrast to
Dughmi et al. [2011a], our rounding algorithm uses some information from bidders’
valuations. Our design does not violate the truthfulness since we use bidders’ values
solely to search for the optimum in a subset of the range containing the optimal so-
lution, as explained in Section 5. This design can be viewed as slightly extending the
convex rounding technique and is of independent interest.
We supplement the allocation rule with a payment rule which allows the guarantee
of non-negativity of payments and individual rationality ex post rather than providing
these important properties only ex ante.
The approximation ratio of our mechanism very closely matches the best approx-
imation ratio presented for GAP with publicly known valuations. In particular, the
proposed convex program contains 1 − 1/e ratio of optimum while the best presented
approximation ratio of non-truthful algorithms is 1− 1/e+ ρ, ρ ≈ 10−180.
In order to solve the convex program, we present a fractional local search algorithm
which approximates the proposed convex optimization problem within an arbitrarily
small error, in the sense of an FPTAS. This leads to an approximate MIDR.
THEOREM 1.1. There is a (1− ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule that achieves a (1− 1/e− ǫ)-
approximation to the social welfare of the generalized assignment problem, for every
ǫ = 1/poly(n).
Dughmi et al. [2011b] show how to transform an approximately MIDR allocation
rule to an approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism (see Definition 2.3). With
this black box transformation, we obtain the following.
THEOREM 1.2. There is a (1− ǫ)-truthful-in-expectationmechanism that achieves a
(1− 1/e− ǫ)-approximation to the social welfare of the generalized assignment problem,
for every ǫ = 1/poly(m,n).
From an algorithmic point of view, the proposed algorithm has advantages over the
previously known optimization algorithms for GAP in terms of runtime and simplic-
ity. We do not employ the ellipsoid method which is identified as pivotal in the work of
Fleischer et al. [2006]. Our algorithm improves on the one proposed by Calinescu et al.
[2011]. In each iteration of the algorithm by Calinescu et al. [2011], a random sam-
pling is required to compute the residual increase of assigning an item to a bin which
subsequently increases runtime. The residual increase is treated as an approximate
evaluation of gradient of the objective function at a point. This residual increase is
in fact calculated by taking the average of (mn)5 independent samples, where m and
n are the number of items and bins, respectively. We use a novel objective function
which is specified exactly, rather than by random sampling, whereby it is possible to
explicitly calculate the gradient of the objective function which helps to simplify the
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algorithm and improve the runtime. It should be noted that in our design, we bene-
fited from the ideas developed in Fleischer et al. [2006], Calinescu et al. [2011], and
Dughmi et al. [2011b].
1.3. Paper Structure
In Section 2 we introduce necessary notation and definitions used throughout the pa-
per. In Section 3 and Section 4 we present the MIDR allocation rule and the payment
rule, respectively for the setting where bins are held by strategic bidders. Section 5
explains why the presented mechanism is truthful. The required modification of the
mechanism for the case where items are held by bidders is explained in Section 6. Fi-
nally, in Section 7 we conclude with a summary and a discussion about future research
questions.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In the generalized assignment problem, there are n bins, I, and m items, J . Let vij
denote the value of bin i for item j. Each bin i has a different weight wij for each item
j and has a limited capacity Ci. Let Fi denote the collection of all feasible assignments
to bin i (∀S ∈ Fi :
∑
j∈S wij ≤ Ci). Each item may be assigned to at most one bin. In
the final allocation, some items may remain unassigned.
We assume weights and capacities are publicly known, yet values of assigning
items to bins are the private information of bidders. More formally, we assume val-
ues {vij}i∈I,j∈J are private information of bidders. In the following, we assume bins
are held by bidders and thus each bidder i has private valuations {vij}j∈J . We ana-
lyze the case where items are held by bidders and each bidder j has private valuations
{vij}i∈I in Section 6.
An allocation (S1, . . . , Sn), where Si ⊆ J denotes the subset assigned to bin i, is
feasible if ∀i ∈ I : Si ∈ Fi and {Si}i∈I are mutually disjoint. The valuation of bin
i is defined as gi : 2
J → R≥0 such that gi(S) =
∑
j∈S vij if S ∈ Fi, else gi(S) = 0.
With an slight abuse of notation, we sometimes use gi(S) instead of gi(Si), where S =
(S1, . . . , Si, . . . , Sn). The social welfare obtained from a feasible allocation (S1, . . . , Sn)
is
∑
i∈I gi(Si). The goal is to find a feasible allocation of maximum total social welfare.
In light of the revelation principle, we limit our attention to direct revelation mech-
anisms. Every mechanism has two main components: an allocation rule and a pay-
ment rule. The allocation rule A is a function which maps a reported valuation
v = (v1, . . . , vn) to an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn), where ∀i : vi = (vij)j∈J . The payment
rule is a function from reported valuations to a required payment from each bidder.
Let pi denote the payment rule function for bidder i.
Definition 2.1 (Maximal in Distributional Range (MIDR)). Given reported valua-
tions v1, . . . , vn, and a previously-defined probability distribution over feasible sets
R, a MIDR returns an outcome sampled randomly from a distribution D∗ ∈ R
that maximizes the expected welfare Ex∼D[
∑
i gi(x)] over all distributions D ∈ R
[Dobzinski and Dughmi 2009].
Analogously, we define (1− ǫ)-MIDR as follows.
Definition 2.2 ((1− ǫ)-MIDR). Given reported valuations v1, . . . , vn, and a
previously-defined probability distribution over feasible sets R, a (1 − ǫ)-MIDR
returns an outcome sampled randomly from a distribution D∗ ∈ R that (1 − ǫ)-
approximately maximizes the expected welfare Ex∼D[
∑
i gi(x)] over all distributions
D ∈ R.
An approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism is defined as follows.
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Definition 2.3 ((1 − ǫ) truthful-in-expectation). A mechanism is (1 − ǫ)-
approximately truthful-in-expectation for GAP if, for every bidder i, (true) valuation
function vi , (reported) valuation function v
′
i, and (reported) valuation functions v−i of
the other bidders,
E[gi(A(vi, v−i))− pi(vi, v−i)] ≥ (1− ǫ)E[gi(A(v
′
i, v−i))− pi(v
′
i, v−i)]. (1)
The expectation in (1) is taken over the coin flips of the mechanism.
The goal of our work is to find an allocation and payment rule which constitute a
truthful-in-expectation mechanism for GAP and approximates the social welfare as
much as possible.
3. MIDR ALLOCATION RULE FOR GAP
We optimize directly over the expected value of the allocation produced by a rounding
algorithm. We let the relaxed feasible set be R as follows: given a vector x ∈ {0, 1}I×2
J
,
let xi,S indicate whether subset S is assigned to bin i.
R =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]I×2
J
|∀i :
∑
S∈Fi
xi,S ≤ 1; ∀i ∈ I, ∀S ∈ Fi : xi,S ≥ 0
}
.
In R one randomized feasible set is assigned to each bin i. The sets assigned to dif-
ferent bins may overlap, however in the rounding step each item is assigned only once.
Our intent is to maximize the expected value of the rounded allocation over relaxed set
R. This leads to a MIDR allocation, as explained in Section 5. Let us call the rounding
algorithm rgreedy. Algorithm 1 presents the desired MIDR algorithm.
ALGORITHM 1: MIDR allocation rule for the generalized assignment problem.
Data: v = (vij)i∈I,j∈J .
Result: Feasible allocation (S1, . . . , Sn).
1. Let x∗ maximize E(S1,...,Sn)∼rgreedy(x)[
∑
i∈I gi(Si)] over x ∈ R.
2. Let (S1, . . . , Sn) ∼ rgreedy(x
∗).
Following is a step-by-step procedure to implement Algorithm 1 and a presentation
of the benefits of the outcome of the algorithm. We start by explaining the rounding
algorithm.
3.1. Greedy Rounding
We choose a rounding algorithm which preserves a good ratio of the fractional solution
and returns a feasible allocation in which each item is assigned only once. We first
define helper function φ(·) which maps a point in R to a point in [0, 1]I×J . Let φ : R →
[0, 1]I×J be such that y = φ(x) iff ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J : yij =
∑
S:j∈S xi,S .
The rounding procedure, defined as Algorithm 3, has two steps. In the first step,
given a point x ∈ R the rounding procedure finds another point x′ ∈ R such that
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J : y′ij = 1 − e
−yij , where y = φ(x) and y′ = φ(x′). In the second step,
the rounding procedure assigns subset S to bin i with probability x′i,S while resolving
conflicts as explained in Algorithm 3.
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We propose Algorithm 2 to perform the first step. Algorithm 2 takes a point x ∈ R
and a desired vector y′ ∈ [0, 1]I×J , where y′  φ(x) and returns another point x′ ∈ R
such that y′ = φ(x′).
ALGORITHM 2: An oblivious method for finding a dominated point in R.
Data: x ∈ R, and y′ ∈ [0, 1]I×J such that y′  φ(x).
Result: x′ ∈ R such that y′ = φ(x′).
Initialize x′ := x; δ = φ(x′)− y′, where δ ∈ [0, 1]I×J .
foreach bin i do
foreach item j do
repeat
Choose x′i,S:j∈S > 0, arbitrarily;
if x′i,S < δij then
δij := δij − x
′
i,S ;
if S \ {j} 6= ∅ then x′i,S\{j} := x
′
i,S\{j} + x
′
i,S ;
x′i,S := 0;
else
x′i,S := x
′
i,S − δij ;
if S \ {j} 6= ∅ then x′i,S\{j} := x
′
i,S\{j} + δij ;
δij := 0;
until δij = 0;
return x′.
Algorithm 2 returns the desired outcome as confirmed by the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.1. Suppose x ∈ R with polynomially-many xi,S > 0, and y
′ ∈ [0, 1]I×J
such that y′  φ(x). If we call Algorithm 2 on x and y′, it returns x′ ∈ R such that
φ(x′) = y′ with only polynomially-many x′i,S > 0.
PROOF. If the algorithm terminates, we will have ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J : δij = 0, and
therefore y′ = φ(x′). Thus, we only need to show that the algorithm terminates in
polynomial time and x′ has polynomially-many positive components. We show the ter-
mination of the algorithm for one bin and one item and since the number of items and
bins is polynomial, we obtain the desired conclusion.
Fix bin i and item j. We consider one iteration in which x′i,S with j ∈ S is chosen. Two
cases can occur. First, x′i,S < δij . In this case, the number of positive components in x
′
does not increase, since xi,S becomes zero and at most another positive component is
added: x′
i,S\{j}. This case can occur as many times as the number of xi,S:j∈S > 0, which
are polynomially-many by assumption.
Second, x′i,S ≥ δij . In this case, only one new positive component may be added:
x′i,S\{j}. However, this case can happen only once for item j, as δij becomes zero in this
step.
Thus, in total for bin i and item j, only one new positive componentmight be included
in x′ compared to x and the number of iterations is polynomial. This completes the
proof.
Thus, for the first step of the rounding algorithm, we call Algorithm 2 on inputs x
and y′ ∈ [0, 1]I×J where ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J : y′ij = 1−e
−yij and y = φ(x), to obtain the desired
point in R. Notice, that y′  y, as needed by Algorithm 2.
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The following is a presentation of the greedy rounding algorithm, rgreedy.
ALGORITHM 3: Greedy rounding algorithm, rgreedy.
Data: x ∈ R with polynomially-many xi,S > 0, v = (vij)i∈I,j∈J .
Result: Feasible allocation (S1, . . . , Sn).
1. Let y = φ(x). Let y′ ∈ [0, 1]I×J be such that y′ij = 1− e
−yij . Invoke Algorithm (2) with x and
y′ as the inputs and let x′ be the result.
2. Assign set S to i with probability x′i,S independently for each bin i. If some item j is assigned
to more than one bin, assign it to the bin among those bins with the maximum value vij . Let Si
be the set assigned to bin i.
return (S1, . . . , Sn).
In order to analyze the performance of the rounding algorithm, we define a new
function.
F : [0, 1]I×J → R≥0
F (y) =
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
(
vσj(i),j − vσj(i+1),j
)(
1− exp(−
i∑
k=1
yσj(k),j)
)
.
Where σj : I → I is a permutation on I such that vσj(i),j is decreasing (non-
increasing) when i runs from 1 to n, and vσj(n+1),j = 0.
Function F (·) is useful in explaining the quality of the rounding algorithm as shown
in the following.
LEMMA 3.2. ∀x ∈ R : E
(S1,...,Sn)∼rgreedy(x)
[∑
i∈I
gi(Si)
]
= F (φ(x)).
PROOF. Assume x ∈ R. Let x′ be the outcome of Step 1 of Algorithm 3. Let y = φ(x)
and y′ = φ(x′). We calculate the expected value achieved from the assignment of item
j in the integral allocation.
Fix item j. For simplicity, we assume that σj(i) = i. This means that bins with
smaller indices have higher valuations for j. We find the expected value returned from
item j; for other items, the argument is similar. With probability y′1j the set assigned
to bin 1 contains j thus j is assigned to 1. Recall that y′1j =
∑
S:j∈S x
′
1,S . Therefore, with
probability y′1j , the value of returned allocation is v1j . With probability (1− y
′
1j)y
′
2j the
set assigned to bin 1 does not contain the item but the set assigned to bin 2 contains
the item and therefore item j is assigned to bin 2. This case leads to a returned value
of (1− y′1j)y
′
2jv2j .
Continuing in a similar manner for other bins, the achievable expected value be-
comes y′1jv1j + (1 − y
′
1j)y
′
2jv2j + . . . +
∏n−1
k=1 (1 − y
′
kj)y
′
njvnj , which in turn equals∑n
i=1(vij − vi+1,j)(1−
∏i
k=1(1− y
′
kj)). The equality of the two terms can be observed by
simply extending the latter. Taking into account that y′ij = 1− e
−yij , by summing over
all items we obtain the desired conclusion, using linearity of expectation.
Therefore, we need to optimize F (φ(x)) over x ∈ R. Optimizing F (φ(x)) over x ∈ R
is essentially the same as optimizing F (y) over y ∈ P , where
P =
{
y ∈ [0, 1]I×J | y = φ(x) & x ∈ R
}
.
As a result, what remains is to explain how to solve maxy∈P F (y), and the quality of
the solution.
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3.2. The Approximation Ratio
We show the quality of our method by comparing maxy∈P F (y) to the optimal solution
to the configuration LP of GAP. The configuration LP of GAP is as follows:
GAP-CLP:
max
∑
i∈I,S∈Fi
xi,Sgi(S)
∀j ∈ J :
∑
i∈I,S∈Fi:j∈S
xi,S ≤ 1,
∀i ∈ I :
∑
S∈Fi
xi,S ≤ 1,
∀i ∈ I, ∀S ∈ Fi : xi,S ≥ 0,
To be able to compare GAP-CLP to F (y), we first introduce a new variable into the
program and then rearrange the objective function. Let y ∈ [0, 1]I×J be such that ∀i ∈
I, ∀j ∈ J : yij =
∑
S∈Fi:j∈S
xi,S . Using this new variable we define polytope P
′ as in the
following:
P ′ =
{
y ∈ [0, 1]I×J |
∀j ∈ J :
∑
i∈I yij ≤ 1; (1)
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J : yij =
∑
S∈Fi:j∈S
xi,S ;
∀i :
∑
S∈Fi
xi,S ≤ 1;
∀i ∈ I, ∀S ∈ Fi : xi,S ≥ 0
}
.
We notice that P ′ ⊆ P since P ′ has an additional constraint (Constraint 1). We
rearrange the objective function of GAP-CLP to be a function of items (y) rather than
subsets, (x).
∑
i∈I,S∈Fi
xi,Sgi(S) =
∑
i∈I,S∈Fi
xi,S
∑
j∈S
vij
=
∑
i∈I,j∈J
vij
∑
S∈Fi:j∈S
xi,S
=
∑
i∈I,j∈J
vijyij
Consequently, solving GAP-CLP is equivalent to finding maxy∈P′
∑
i∈I,j∈J vijyij . We
are now ready to compare maxy∈P F (y) with the optimal integral solution to the GAP
(denoted by OPT ).
LEMMA 3.3. maxy∈P F (y) ≥ (1−
1
e
)OPT .
PROOF. We observe that
max
y∈P
F (y) ≥ max
y∈P′
F (y) ≥ (1−
1
e
)max
y∈P′
∑
i∈I,j∈J
vijyij ≥ (1−
1
e
)OPT.
The first inequality holds since P ′ ⊆ P . The last inequality holds because
max
y∈P′
∑
i∈I,j∈J
vijyij in fact provides a solution to GAP-CLP which is obviously greater
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than OPT . For the second inequality, consider item j and y ∈ P ′. For simplicity, we
assume ∀i : σj(i) = i. We have
∑n
i=1 yij ≤ 1, since y ∈ P
′. Considering the fact that
1− e−x ≥ (1− 1
e
)x for x ∈ [0, 1], we obtain
(v1j − v2j)(1− e
−y1j ) ≥ (v1j − v2j)(1−
1
e
)y1j
(v2j − v3j)(1− e
−y1j−y2j ) ≥ (v2j − v3j)(1−
1
e
)(y1j + y2j)
. . .
(vn−1,j − vnj)(1 − e
−
∑n−1
k=1
ykj ) ≥ (vn−1,j − vnj)(1 −
1
e
)(
∑n−1
k=1 ykj)
(vnj)(1 − e
−
∑
n
k=1
ykj ) ≥ (vnj)(1−
1
e
)(
∑n
k=1 ykj)
Summing both sides, we obtain
n∑
i=1
(
vi,j − vi+1,j
)(
1− exp(−
i∑
k=1
yk,j)
)
≥
(
1−
1
e
)∑
i∈I
vijyij .
Obtaining this inequality for all items then, and summing them up, we obtain the
desired conclusion.
Thus, what remains is to show how to maximize F (y) over y ∈ P , the topic of Section
3.3.
3.3. Solving the Convex Optimization Problem
We wish to solve maxy∈P F (y) which is essentially equivalent to the following mathe-
matical optimization problem:
GAP-CP:
Maximize
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
(
vσj(i),j − vσj(i+1),j
)(
1− exp(−
i∑
k=1
yσj(k),j)
)
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J :
∑
S∈Fi:j∈S
xi,S = yij ,
∀i ∈ I :
∑
S∈Fi
xi,S ≤ 1,
∀i ∈ I, ∀S ∈ Fi : xi,S ≥ 0.
First, we show that GAP-CP is a convex optimization problem. All constraints in
the program are linear thus we only need to show that the objective function, F (y), is
concave/convex as shown by the following theorem.
LEMMA 3.4. F (y) is a concave function.
PROOF. F (y) is concave in y, because it is a non-negative weighted sum of func-
tions which are compositions of the concave function 1 − e−x with affine function
x→
∑i
k=1 yσj(k),j [Boyd and Vandenberghe 2009].
In order to solve the convex optimization problem, we present a fractional local
search algorithm. Our algorithm gets arbitrarily close to the optimal solution. The
difficulty in solving the convex optimization problem mostly arises from the exponen-
tial number of variables in the convex program. As a result, we are able to implement
a (1− ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule, for any ǫ = 1/poly(n).
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Our algorithm employs a polynomial number of iterations to get as close as a prede-
fined precision to the optimal solution. In every iteration of the algorithm, we need to
find y∗ ∈ P which maximizes y · ∇F (y) 2 over all y ∈ P . According to Proposition 3.5,
maximizing y · v over all y ∈ P for every cost function v, is equivalent to finding set
S∗i ∈ Fi for every bin i which maximizes
∑
j∈S∗
i
vij .
PROPOSITION 3.5. maxy∈P
∑
i∈I,j∈J vijyij =
∑
i∈I max{
∑
j∈S vij : S ∈ Fi}.
PROOF.
max
y∈P
∑
i∈I,j∈J
vijyij = max
x∈R
∑
i∈I,j∈J
(
vij
∑
S∈Fi:j∈S
xi,S
)
= max
x∈R
∑
i∈I
∑
S∈Fi
(
xi,S
∑
j∈S
vij
)
=
∑
i∈I
max{
∑
j∈S
vij : S ∈ Fi}.
The first equality holds since for every y ∈ P , there exists x ∈ R where y = φ(x). The
last equality holds since if x ∈ R then
∑
S∈Fi
xi,S ≤ 1.
Findingmax{
∑
j∈S vij : S ∈ Fi} is essentially solving a knapsack subproblem for bin
i. To do so, we invoke the FPTAS for the knapsack problem.We say for any vi = (vij)j∈J
and 0 < ǫ < 1, KnapsackFptas(vi, ǫ) returns subset Si ∈ Fi where
∑
j∈Si
vij > (1 −
ǫ)max{
∑
j∈S vij : S ∈ Fi}.
We store the computed vector in each iteration in a set Z. We keep the size of Z to
be of at most 1
δ
for δ = 1
n
; δ will be defined later. As long as |Z| < 1
δ
we simply add
the current vector to Z. When |Z| = 1
δ
, in each iteration we add the current vector
and remove one vector from Z which has the least value with respect to the current
gradient. The solution returned by the algorithm, x, has the property that y = φ(x) is
a convex combination of the vectors in Z: y = δ ·
∑
z∈Z z. We continue updating Z until
the increase in F (y) is below a predefined threshold.
Now, we present the main algorithm. Let M denote max{vij : i ∈ I; j ∈ J}.
ALGORITHM 4: Fractional local search algorithm
Data: v = (vij)i∈I,j∈J , 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/n.
Result: x ∈ R such that F (φ(x)) ≥ (1− o(1))max{F (y)|y ∈ P}.
0. Initialize x := ~0; y := ~0; Z = ∅; δ = ǫ
6mn2
;
1. u := ∇F (y); z := ~0; ; /* x ∈ [0, 1]I×2
J
and y, u, z ∈ [0, 1]I×J */
2. foreach bin i do
Let S :=KnapsackFptas(ui, ǫ); for all j ∈ S update zij := 1;
3. if (z − y) · ∇F (y) > ǫM then
if (|Z| < 1
δ
) then
Update y := y + δz; Z := Z ∪ {z};
else
Update y := y + δ(z − zmin), where zmin = argmin
z′∈Z
z′ · u; Z := (Z \ {zmin}) ∪ {z};
Go back to Step 1;
4. foreach z ∈ Z do
foreach bin i do
Update xi,S := xi,S + δ, where S = {j|zij = 1};
return x.
2We remind the reader that∇F , the gradient of F, is a vector whose coordinates are the first partial deriva-
tives ∂F
∂yij
. We denote by ∂F
∂yij
∣
∣
y
the gradient coordinate (i, j) evaluated at point y.
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LEMMA 3.6. Algorithm 4 produces a solution x such that x ∈ R.
PROOF. We observe that the set Z contains at most 1
δ
elements; as long as |Z| < 1
δ
,
one element z is included into the set and when |Z| = 1
δ
, one element is added and one
element is removed from the set.
Towards the end of Algorithm 4 (Step 4), for each z ∈ Z and each bin i, one positive
component (xi,S) is increased up to δ which in turn means for each bin i we have∑
S∈Fi
xi,S ≤
1
δ
· δ = 1. That means x ∈ R, the desired conclusion.
LEMMA 3.7. Algorithm 4 returns x ∈ R such that F (φ(x)) ≥ (1−o(1))max{F (y)|y ∈
P}.
PROOF. Assume x is the outcome of Algorithm 4. According to Lemma 3.6, x ∈
R. Let y = φ(x). Let z be the calculated vector in the last iteration in Step 2, i.e.
(z − y) · ∇F (y) ≤ ǫM .
Let y∗ = argmaxy∈P F (y). According to Proposition 3.5, z ·∇F (y) ≥ (1− ǫ)maxw∈P w ·
∇F (y). Hence, z · ∇F (y) ≥ (1− ǫ)y∗ · ∇F (y). Thus, we get
F (y∗)− F (y) ≤ (y∗ − y) · ∇F (y)
≤ 11−ǫ(z · ∇F (y)− y · ∇F (y)) +
ǫ
1−ǫy · ∇F (y)
≤ ǫ1−ǫM + ǫF (y
∗)
The first inequality is because of the concavity of F . The second inequality is by
rearranging and using inequality z · ∇F (y) ≥ (1 − ǫ)y∗ · ∇F (y). The third inequality
holds since (z−y) ·∇F (y) ≤ ǫM , and y ·∇F (y) < (1− ǫ)F (y∗). If y ·∇F (y) ≥ (1− ǫ)F (y∗)
then, by concavity of F , F (y) ≥ y · ∇F (y) ≥ (1 − ǫ)F (y∗), and therefore Lemma 3.7
holds.
Now, using ǫ = 1
n
, we obtain F (y∗) − F (y) ≤ 1
n−1M +
1
n
F (y∗) ≤ 2
n−1F (y
∗). Hence,
when Algorithm 4 terminates F (y) ≥ (1− o(1))F (y∗), the desired conclusion.
The change in y in each iteration is either δz or δ(z − zmin) for |Z| < 1
δ
and |Z| =
1
δ
, respectively. The change in gradient, however, has a certain upper bound when y
changes by a certain amount, as Lemma 3.8 shows.
LEMMA 3.8. For any y and y′ with ||y − y′||∞ ≤ δ and any i and j,
e−nδ ·
∂F
∂yij
∣∣∣∣
y
≤
∂F
∂yij
∣∣∣∣
y′
≤ enδ ·
∂F
∂yij
∣∣∣∣
y
.
PROOF. Consider the gradient of F . For simplicity, we assume that σj(i) = i.
∂F
∂yij
=
n∑
l=i
(vlj − vl+1,j) exp(−
l∑
k=1
ykj). (2)
Considering
∑l
k=1 y
′
kj ≤
∑n
k=1 ykj + nδ and from (2) we obtain
∂F
∂yij
∣∣∣∣
y′
≥ e−nδ · ∂F
∂yij
∣∣∣∣
y
.
Similarly, from
∑l
k=1 y
′
kj ≥
∑n
k=1 ykj − nδ and (2), we arrive at
∂F
∂yij
∣∣∣∣
y′
≤ enδ · ∂F
∂yij
∣∣∣∣
y
.
This completes the proof.
The following lemma is useful in showing the progress of the algorithm.
LEMMA 3.9. For any y and y′ with ||y − y′||∞ ≤ δ,
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(y′ − y) · ∇F (y′) ≥ (y′ − y) · ∇F (y)− 3δn2mM.
PROOF. Let y′ − y = z+ − z− where for all i and j, 0 ≤ z+ij ≤ δ and 0 ≤ z
−
ij ≤ δ.
From Lemma 3.8, z+ · ∇F (y′) ≥ e−nδz+ · ∇F (y) and z− · ∇F (y′) ≤ enδz− · ∇F (y). From
these inequalities and using inequalities e−x ≥ 1− x and ex ≤ 1 + 2x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and
δ < 1/n, we get
(y′ − y) · ∇F (y′) = (z+ − z−) · ∇F (y′)
≥ (e−nδz+ − enδz−) · ∇F (y)
≥ ((1− nδ)z+ − (1 + 2nδ)z−) · ∇F (y)
= (z+ − z−) · ∇F (y)− nδ(z+ + 2z−) · ∇F (y)
≥ (y′ − y) · ∇F (y)− 3δn2mM.
The last inequality holds because for every z ∈ [0, 1]I×J , z · ∇F (y) ≤ nmM . This is
true since for any y, we have ∂F
∂yij
≤ M and in the best possible case for z, every bin
packs the m items and produces a value of mM . This completes the proof.
LEMMA 3.10. In each iteration, the value of F (y) increases by at least ǫ
2
12mn2M .
PROOF. As long as the algorithm continues we have (z− y) · ∇F (y) > ǫM . First, we
consider the case where |Z| < 1
δ
. We have
F (y + δz) ≥ F (y) + δz · ∇F (y + δz)
≥ F (y) + δe−nδz · ∇F (y)
≥ F (y) + δe−nδǫM
The first inequality is because of the concavity of F . The second inequality holds
because of Lemma 3.8. The third inequality is because (z − y) · ∇F (y) > ǫM implies
that z · ∇F (y) > ǫM , as we always have ∇F (y) ≥ ~0.
Now, using δ = ǫ6mn2 , we obtain
F (y + δz) ≥ F (y) +
ǫ2
12mn2
M.
Second, we consider the case where |Z| = 1
δ
. We have
F (y + δ(z − zmin)) ≥ F (y) + δ(z − zmin) · ∇F (y + δ(z − zmin))
≥ F (y) + δ(z − zmin) · ∇F (y)− 3δ2n2mM
≥ F (y) + δǫM − 3δ2mn2M
The first inequality is because of the concavity of F . The second inequality holds
because of Lemma 3.9. The third inequality is because (z−zmin)·∇F (y) ≥ (z−y)·∇F (y),
as shown in the following.
By definition of zmin, zmin · ∇F (y) ≤ z′ · ∇F (y) for all z′ ∈ Z. Thus, |Z| · zmin ·
∇F (y) ≤
∑
z′∈Z z
′ · ∇F (y), which in turn means zmin · ∇F (y) ≤ y · ∇F (y). Observe that
y = δ ·
∑
z′∈Z z
′.
Now, using δ = ǫ6mn2 , we obtain
F (y + δ(z − zmin)) ≥ F (y) +
ǫ2
12mn2
M.
This completes the proof.
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LEMMA 3.11. After at most 12m2n2/ǫ2 iterations, Algorithm 4 terminates.
PROOF. Since M denotes max{vij : i ∈ I; j ∈ J}, mM is an upper bound for
maxy∈P F (y). Recall that
max
y∈P
F (y) = max
x∈R
E
(S1,...,Sn)∼rgreedy(x)
[∑
i∈I
gi(Si)
]
≤ mM.
Based on Lemma 3.10, in each iteration the growth in value is at least ǫ
2
12mn2M ,
Algorithm 4 thus in at most 12m2n2/ǫ2 iterations, reaches the value of mM , which is
an upper bound on the best solution. This concludes the proof.
We thus achieve a (1 − ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule that runs in polynomial time. This
concludes the proof of Theorem 1.1.
3.4. Simplifying the Rounding Procedure
As we note, it is possible to simplify the rounding procedure (Algorithm 3), further. The
simplified rounding is as follows.
Given x ∈ R, let y = φ(x). We assign set S to each bin i independently with probabil-
ity xi,S . Next, for each item j we do as follows. If item j is assigned to bin i, we let the
bin hold the item with probability 1−e
−yij
yij
. This means, we withdraw the item from the
bin with the complementary probability 1 − 1−e
−yij
yij
to make sure that the probability
of assigning item j to bin i is not yij but 1 − e
−yij which is necessary to maintain the
MIDR property. According to the MIDR principle, the expected value of the random-
ized integral assignment should equal the calculated fractional value. Finally, if some
item j is assigned to more than one bin, we assign it to the bin among those bins with
the maximum value vij .
In order to use the allocation rule algorithm (Algorithm 1) as an optimization al-
gorithm, one can employ a more simple rounding algorithm. The simpler rounding
requires only Step 2 of Algorithm 3. For an optimization purpose, there is no need to
also execute Step 1 of Algorithm 3. Thus, after finding a fractional solution x by invok-
ing Algorithm 4, we assign set S to each bin i with probability xi,S and resolve conflicts
according to the technique explained in Algorithm 3. This improves the runtime for the
optimization purpose.
4. COMPUTING PAYMENTS
Supplementing the MIDR allocation rule of Section 3 with VCG payments yields a
truthful-in-expectation mechanism. We compute payments in order to also enforce
non-negativity of payments and individual rationality, ex post.
To compute the VCG fractional payment pfraci for bidder i, we need to compute two
components: first, the Clarke pivot, hi(v−i), which is the best achievable social welfare
by bidders other than i, and second, the value gained by bidders other than bidder i in
the current fractional solution. We can calculate hi(v−i) by rewriting GAP-CP for the
market without bidder i, i.e. vij = 0 for all j. To compute the value gained by other
bidders in the fractional allocation, F−i(y
∗), we set ∀j ∈ J : vij = 0 in F (y
∗), assuming
that y∗ is the outcome of Algorithm 4. Function F (y) is explicitly known to us and we
can set in it vij to 0. Finally, p
frac
i = hi(v−i)− F−i(y
∗).
Example 4.1. Consider a setting in which two bidders (1 and 2) have valuations for
two items as follows: v11 = 8, v12 = 5 and v21 = 4, v22 = 10. In this case,
F (y) = (8− 4)(1− e−y11) + 4(1− e−y11−y21) + (10− 5)(1− e−y22) + 5(1− e−y12−y22).
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Now, assume y∗1 = (0.6, 0.3) and y
∗
2 = (0.4, 0.7). Then,
F−1(y
∗) = (0− 4)(1− e−0.6) + 4(1− e−1) + (10− 0)(1− e−0.7) + 0(1− e−1).
The value gained by bidder i in the fractional allocation is therefore wfraci = F (y
∗) −
F−i(y
∗). Assuming that Si is the subset assigned to bidder i by the rounding proce-
dure, we can compute the randomized payment for bidder i, pi, satisfying individual
rationality and non-negativity of payments as follows.
pi =
{
gi(Si)
w
frac
i
pfraci if w
frac
i > 0,
0 if wfraci = 0.
5. TRUTHFULNESS
It has been proven that if the allocation algorithm of a mechanism is maximal-in-range
and the payment rule calculates the payments by applying the same payment idea as
in VCG, then the mechanism is truthful [Nisan and Ronen 2007]. Mechanisms using
the idea of VCG to calculate payments are termed VCG-based mechanisms.
Obviously, our mechanism is a VCG-based mechanism as we calculate the payments
following the idea of VCG. In order to show truthfulness, it suffices to show that the al-
location algorithm is maximal-in-range. Since our mechanism is randomized, we need
to show that the allocation rule is maximal in distributional range. To do so, we de-
scribe the distributional range of allocations over which the allocation rule optimizes
social welfare to optimality. By MIDR definition, the range of allocations has to be
chosen before any valuation has been seen.
Let Π denote the set of all permutations on all bins. The rounding algorithm (Algo-
rithm 3) actually works with a specific permutation on bins for each item. In particular,
the rounding algorithm uses σj for each item j which reorders the bins in decreasing
order of their values for item j. We recall that σj is formally defined in Subsection 3.1.
We can look at the rounding algorithm as a function which takes the permutation
πj for each item j as input. Let us call this parameterized rounding algorithm r and
define it as Algorithm 5.
ALGORITHM 5: Rounding algorithm, r.
Data: x ∈ R, πj ∈ Π for each item j.
Result: Feasible allocation (S1, . . . , Sn).
1. Let y = φ(x). Let y′ ∈ [0, 1]I×J be such that y′ij = 1− e
−yij . Invoke Algorithm (2) with x and
y′ as the inputs and let x′ be the result.
2. Independently for each bin i, assign set S to i with probability x′i,S . If some item j is assigned
to more than one bin, then assign item j to the bin among those bins that precedes others in πj .
return (S1, . . . , Sn).
Algorithm 3 thus can be rewritten as rgreedy(x) = r(x, σ1, σ2, . . . , σm).
For each point x ∈ R, r(x, π1, . . . , πm) rounds point x to an integer point by taking
into account permutation πj ∈ Π for each item j. We let the domain of function r
comprise all x ∈ R as well as all πj ∈ Π, ∀j ∈ J . The range of function r then is the
range over which our allocation algorithm optimizes the social welfare. Formally, we
define the range as follows.
Range ≡
⋃
x∈R,π∈ΠJ
{r(x, π)}.
The range is clearly independent of private values as it only takes into account points
x and the permutations. Maximizing over this range defines a maximal in distribu-
tional range algorithm. In order to maximize over the range we don’t need to search
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the full range. Rather, it suffices to look for the maximum only in the part of the range
containing the maximum.
We utilize this fact in our MIDR. In particular, in Algorithm 1 we maximize
r(x, σ1, . . . , σm) over x ∈ R. There is no need to take into account other permutations
since the value of r(x, σ1, . . . , σm) is always as high as that of r(x, π1, . . . , πm) where at
least for one j πj 6= σj . To rephrase, maximizing r(x, σ1 , . . . , σm) over x ∈ R is equiv-
alent to maximizing r(x, π1, . . . , πm) over x ∈ R for all πj ∈ Π, j ∈ J . This is true
because for each item j when there is a tie (Step 2 of Algorithm 5) assigning the item
to the bin with the highest value for the item, obviously produces a higher value. To
the best our knowledge, this is the first time that such an observation has been used
for maximizing over a range.
6. WHEN ITEMS ARE HELD BY BIDDERS
Here, we mention the required modifications for the case where items are held by
bidders rather than the bins. Such bidders are called unit-demand bidders. To bet-
ter expose the changes we index bidders by j in the following. The allocation rule A
takes reported valuations v = (v1, . . . , vm), vj = (vij)i∈I for all j ∈ J and returns
(i1, i2, . . . , im) where ij is the bin to which item j is assigned. Let pj denote the pay-
ment rule function for bidder j. We use vj(i1, . . . , ij , . . . , im) instead of vij for the sake
of simplicity in the definition below.
Definition 6.1 (truthful-in-expectation). A mechanism is truthful-in-expectation for
GAP (when items are held by bidders) if, for every bidder j, (true) valuation function
vj , (reported) valuation function v
′
j , and (reported) valuation functions v−j of the other
bidders,
E[vj(A(vj , v−j))− pj(vj , v−j)] ≥ E[vj(A(v
′
j , v−j))− pj(v
′
j , v−j)]. (3)
The expectation in (3) is taken over the coin flips of the mechanism.
For this type of bidders, we maximize over the range defined in Section 5 to obtain a
MIDR. That is, we use Algorithm 1 as the allocation rule. We need however a different
payment rule for this type of bidders.
In order to calculate VCG fractional payment pfracj , we need to calculate Clarke pivot
hj(v−j) and the value gained by bidders other than j in the current fractional solution,
F−j(y
∗).We calculate hj(v−j) by running Algorithm 4 after evaluating vij to 0 for all i ∈
I. Also, we have F−j(y
∗) =
∑m
l=1,l 6=j
∑n
i=1
(
vσl(i),l − vσl(i+1),l
)(
1 − exp(−
∑i
k=1 y
∗
σl(k),l
)
)
.
By letting wfracj = F (y
∗)− F−j(y
∗) and assuming that item j is assigned to bin i in the
rounded solution, the payment of bidder j is calculated as follows.
pj =
{
vij
w
frac
j
pfracj if w
frac
j > 0,
0 if wfracj = 0.
7. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of mechanism design for a strategic variant of GAP where
valuations are assumed to be private information known only to the bidders while
weights and capacities are publicly known. Given that GAP is NP-hard, and that VCG
is not trivially truthful with suboptimal solutions, we resorted to approximation mech-
anisms.
We proposed a solution by which the two obstacles, maximizing the social welfare
of GAP as well as extracting true valuations of bidders, are surmounted. The solution
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provides bidders with incentives to report their valuations truthfully and runs in poly-
nomial time approximating the social welfare with a provable ratio of at least 1− 1/e.
In comparison to the approximation algorithms presented for GAP without incen-
tive issues, our proposed algorithm has advantages in terms of runtime and simplicity
while presenting the same approximation ratio. Our work also shows that the con-
vex rounding technique is a powerful machinery for designing truthful approximation
mechanisms and might find other applications in the field.
A problem which remains to be solved is the analysis of the strategic version of GAP
in which weights and capacities are also private. We conjecture there is no constant
ratio truthful mechanism for this problem.
Another problem to be solved is to find a truthful mechanism for GAP with private
values which stipulates that no item in the final allocation may remain unassigned.
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